World War, has widely been acknowledged to have been a major hub of wartime technological research. Despite its reputation for technocracy, until relatively late in the war the design and construction of technology by the agency was conducted in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion to address specific problems. More generally, the agency's initial approach to its mandate (the reading of communications traffic of foreign powers and the security of Britain own traffic) was notable for its collegiate amateurism. Yet, in 1943, it undertook a machine development project which was very different from the technology projects which had preceded it because it was characterised by professionalism and long-term planning. That project was the Rockex cipher system, and it marked the culmination of a wider cultural transformation in the wartime agency as it moved towards professionalism. That Bletchley Park underwent transformation has been well established and some of the important social and bureaucratic aspects of these changes have been considered in detail. 1 However, the actual processes of cultural change within the agency, resulting in professionalisation and mechanisation, still remain poorly understood. This article, utilising the Rockex project as a case study will outline those processes, moreover it will demonstrate that the project itself played a hitherto unrecognised key role as a catalyst in that process.
Bletchley Park and the Development of the Rockex Cipher Systems: Building a Technocratic Culture, 1941-1945
The Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), housed at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, has widely been acknowledged to have been a major hub of wartime technological research. Despite its reputation for technocracy, until relatively late in the war the design and construction of technology by the agency was conducted in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion to address specific problems. More generally, the agency's initial approach to its mandate (the reading of communications traffic of foreign powers and the security of Britain own traffic) was notable for its collegiate amateurism. Yet, in 1943, it undertook a machine development project which was very different from the technology projects which had preceded it because it was characterised by professionalism and long-term planning. That project was the Rockex cipher system, and it marked the culmination of a wider cultural transformation in the wartime agency as it moved towards professionalism. That Bletchley Park underwent transformation has been well established and some of the important social and bureaucratic aspects of these changes have been considered in detail. 1 However, the actual processes of cultural change within the agency, resulting in professionalisation and mechanisation, still remain poorly understood. This article, utilising the Rockex project as a case study will outline those processes, moreover it will demonstrate that the project itself played a hitherto unrecognised key role as a catalyst in that process.
At the beginning of the Second World War, GC&CS was woefully unprepared for the contest that Profound though the introduction of machines to the agency was, it is necessary to recognise that these devices were only tenuous solutions to the problems the agency faced; minor alterations in the cryptographic techniques of the Axis powers would render the agency's machines obsolete. The result was that, in spite of their successes with machines, by 1943 important technocraticallyminded individuals within the agency's management, such as the mathematician Gordon Welchman, viewed the agency's history of building and incorporating machines with growing dissatisfaction.
The technocrats within the agency represented a new breed of cryptanalyst and manager. Where the agency's traditional hunting grounds for recruits had been the humanities departments of Britain's ancient universities, in wartime the agency instead increasingly turned to mathematicians. The result was that some of these individuals had technical and mechanical skills that led to the agency's early mechanisation programme. The process of mechanisation they initiated was transformative but gradual, and by the end of the war the agency was instead characterised by professionalism, and by its strong emphasis on planning and mechanised industrialism. So considerable was this transformation that Britain was to emerge in 1945 as a world leader in communications security and cryptanalysis, complete with cutting edge technologies. 8 The project to build Rockex family of cipher machines marked a hitherto unrecognised turning point that process of transformation. When the agency adopted the project in 1943, the cultural changes that had been underway since 1939
were catalysed, and the project was identified by men like Welchman as a new beginning for the agency. On a technical level, the Rockex project itself marked the next step in the evolution of machine cryptography. 9 Where the previous generation of cipher machines typically utilised rotors as the primary means to scramble messages, Rockex utilised teleprinter technology to jumble two streams of data together. Significantly, the project also marked the next step in how the agency went about designing and introducing new machines. The project incorporated the lessons of machine design and implementation learned earlier in the war, but more importantly was seen as an opportunity to serve as a test case for future projects. Moreover, unlike previous wartime machine development projects, the Rockex was designed with long-term objectives in mind; the security of British communications well into the post-war period.
By 1943 GC&CS was in a position to approach the process of mechanisation in the manner suggested by its technocrats; with a clear emphasis on planning and testing. Its successes had won the agency the respect of Whitehall and the armed services, but more importantly the gradual cultural transformation towards professionalisation had progressed sufficiently to allow the Rockex project to serve as a trial for extending that professionalism to the key area of mechanisation, and the project itself served to further catalyse that process. Machine research and development had at last taken centre stage in the agency's vision for its long-term future. However, the newly formed GC&CS suffered under post-war retrenchment and began life with just 56 staff members. 11 Over the twenty years from its inception to the outbreak of the Second World War, the agency had profited only little from Britain's rearmament policy, and, as noted above, when GC&CS relocated to Bletchley Park in 1939 it still employed only 200 staff. 12 Moreover, most of these were relatively new to the agency, having been recruited in the late 1930s as the international situation became increasingly tense. 13 The result was that GC&CS was unprepared for the challenges posed by a new global conflict. A significant problem was that over the course of the inter-war period communications security had undergone a major transformation. During the First World War ciphers had been non-mechanical, but during the inter-war period the Axis powers had introduced highly sophisticated mechanical cipher systems, the most famous of these being Enigma.
Mechanising the Government Code and Cypher School
Enigma posed an unprecedented problem for cryptanalysts. The system revolutionised cipher security by offering portability, relatively swift operation, and an extremely high degree of security.
Indeed, the system was so secure that British cryptanalysts swiftly arrived at the conclusion that it unbreakable and invested their energies in other less secure communications networks, in particular Soviet traffic. 14 In the late 1930s, the only potential means that the agency could see to make major headway with Enigma was to place faith in technology: the problem posed by a mechanical cipher machine required a mechanical solution. 15 However, at that time, GC&CS had no such technology, and neither did it have the technically proficient staff to design one, nor the inclination let alone resources to put any such design into production. The looming hostilities in the final months of the inter-war period demanded a reconsideration of this position. 16 A shift towards mechanising cryptanalysis was generate shortly before the German invasion of Poland, when a conference between British, Polish and French cryptanalysts was organised.
Unbeknownst to GC&CS, Polish cryptanalysts, of course worried by a resurgent and increasingly militaristic and expansionist Germany, had been investigating Enigma to. 17 Unlike the British, however, the Poles had heavily invested in the problem and applied their most proficient young cryptanalysts to addressing it. Like their British counterparts in GC&CS, the Poles concluded that the development of new mechanical cryptanalytic technology was essential not merely to break the variants of Enigma being used at that time by the German military services, but to break it regularly and in a sufficiently timely fashion to allow the Polish intelligence service to make use of the information gained. However, unlike the British, the Polish cryptanalysts had set about designing and developing just such a machine, namely the Bomba.
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The fact that the Poles had designed, built and begun successfully to utilise a custom-made cryptanalytic machine to address the new problems posed by mechanised ciphers, while GC&CS The genesis of the Bombe machine, designed by Turing and further upgraded by Welchman, proved a major technical breakthrough for GC&CS and transformed its ability to rapidly break and read Enigma traffic. However, before mass production of the machine could be undertaken, three major structural changes to the agency were necessary. First, the agency had to forge important links with external institutions capable of turning the ideas behind the machine into a mechanical reality. The agency had neither the engineering expertise nor the factory facilities to build Bombe machines, still less to produce them in substantial numbers on a regular basis. To facilitate a building programme, the agency turned to the British Tabulating Machine Company and its workshops housed in Letchworth. 23 Second, the agency also required a substantial staff contingent to operate the machines. This was absolutely imperative: for each machine that arrived from BTM's production line, at least ten staff were required to operate it on a 24-hour basis. 24 Furthermore, once the Bombe machines began rapidly to accelerate the rate at which GC&CS could produce viable intelligence, greater bureaucratisation of the agency was necessary. Further staff were required to perform the substantial additional administrative and clerical work arising, and to establish a major communications machine section to distribute a large amount of information to Whitehall and commands in the field. Fortunately, GC&CS was able to draw upon the sizable pools of labour at the disposal of its client ministries. In the case of Bombe operation, the agency requested that the Admiralty to provide operators in the form of young women from the Women's Royal Naval Service, while communications staff and clerical workers were drawn from the Women's Auxiliary Air Force and Foreign Office respectively. 25 Third, the amount of Axis traffic intercepted by the British increased rapidly, and beyond the capacity of the new Bombe machines to easily process. In turn, this required the creation of a bureaucratic process to allocate machine time, which would distribute Bombe usage so to prevent GC&CS's machine resources being monopolised by just one of the agency's actual or potential client ministries. 26 Ultimately, GC&CS, in order to successfully utilise its new technology, was slowly to develop an information production line operated on professional factory principles.
This process of professionalisation was, however, by no means smooth. As in the case of developing the Bombe machine, in the first instance there was both resistance and lethargy within the agency when it came to the creation of a bureaucratic body to allocate Bombe time. Indeed, despite the first Bombe machine being delivered to Bletchley Park in 1940, it was not until 1942 that a committee to oversee the allocation of Bombe time was introduced. 27 Also problematically, the machines developed by GC&CS, though ultimately successful, were only barely sufficient to address the volume of traffic that arrived at Bletchley's gates and the complexity of the ciphers which protected that traffic. 28 Minor alterations to Axis cipher procedure, or to technical specifications of the cipher machines, could swiftly render the Bombe machines, and those designed to tackle other cipher systems, ineffective. Moreover, the actual building of machines and development of improvements were processes fraught with difficulty. production and supply problems, and machines arrived from Letchworth in only limited numbers until 1943. 29 Though this was not the fault of GC&CS, the lethargy in the implementation of a system to allocate Bombe time served only to aggravate the problem. Second, the agency arranged for two different teams of contractors to work on the development of upgrades for the system and the competition between the rival groups, as well as their champions within the agency, resulted in months of bitter acrimony and delay.
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There was also a failure to adequately address the personnel problems derived from mechanisation. However, with increasing personnel came other problems, not least accommodating and feeding workers. In these arenas GC&CS lurched from one administrative crisis to the next as the number of employees increased beyond the capacity of the existing facilities to cope. In each instance, the agency was forced repeatedly and rapidly to develop new solutions to both accommodation and catering as the existing services were pushed to breaking point. The perennial problem GC&CS faced in the opening years of the war was that its primary mandate, the rapid breaking and subsequent reading of Axis traffic, and required increasingly vast resources and bureaucratic structures. The retrenchment of the inter-war period, and the institutional culture of that period, had left the agency unprepared for the challenges posed by the Second World War. The introduction of mechanised cryptanalytic processes required an exponential increase in both staffing and materiel which agency officials had no experience in either managing or developing.
Importantly, the escalation of the war, and with it the rapid increase in the amount of traffic the agency was required to read, meant that systematic envisioning of future requirements was all but impossible, and therefore planning was hindered. The agency was forced to develop ad hoc remedies to the problems it faced and the resulting solutions, bureaucratic and technological, were fragile and in need of constant adaptation. 
The Rockex System
The Rockex was a machine which utilised teleprinter technology to produce ciphers capable of concealing the content of messages transmitted both by cable and wireless. 35 While this machine still remains has failed to attract the public and scholarly interest of some of GC&CS's other machines, most notably the Bombe machine, it has been some historical study. For instance, the intelligence historian John Ferris, as well as the published internal history of the British Security Coordination, have already summarised the technical specifications and operation of the machine.
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In addition, Ferris considered the influence of geopolitical and diplomatic environment on the development of Rockex. It is, therefore, beyond the provision of a brief, unnecessary to comment on the machine's technical specifications or origins here. However, missing from Ferris' account is a commentary on the internal cultural forces within the agency, which drove GC&CS towards professionalisation and mechanisation, and had a profound influence on the machine's development.
Similarly, also missing is consideration of the role of the Rockex project itself in further catalysing change within the agency's internal culture. In particular, they include Gordon Welchman's dissatisfaction with the agency's previous wartime machine development programme and his efforts to professionalise technological development within the agency.
Specifically, the significance of the Rockex project is that it demonstrates the increasing importance 35 Telekrypton machine primed with an identical reel of random data, nobody could conceivably read the message. However, Telekrypton had two major problems. First, the machine was technically overly complex and prone to mechanical failure. Second, the tape containing random data was fed into the machine in a loop. In order to maximise security, and in doing so generate a 'one-time pad'
(so named because the cipher's key, generated at random, is used once and only once), the tape needed to be potentially infinite in length. 40 Such is the strength of a one-time pad that it is mathematically impossible for a cryptanalyst to break such a cipher.
Therefore, a randomly generated stream of data of infinite length constitutes just such a key.
'Pat' Bayly, a Canadian professor of Electrical Engineering, still saw some potential in the system.
Bayly had been recruited in 1941 by British Security Coordination (BSC), the Secret Intelligence
Service's (SIS) arm in the US, to run its communications network, transmitting messages between London and New York via Ottawa. The volume of this traffic, and bottle-necks in the existing network, were causing delays. Bayly determined that a new mechanical apparatus, which would increase the speed at which messages were enciphered and forwarded from Ottawa, was necessary.
He concluded that, by remodelling Telekrypton, and eliminating its flaws, he could make the system serve as an elegant solution to his problem. Consequently, Bayly set about stripping the machine of unnecessary parts and redesigning it to operate as a one-time pad system. However, before the system could be effectively used to transmit transatlantic traffic, Bayly needed to devise a method of converting teleprinter data into a form of data capable of being transmitted via wireless and in the medium of Morse Code. Teleprinter code employed 32 characters, but Morse only 26, and the additional six characters would, if not removed, corrupt the transmitted text. Bayly was able to solve this problem, and in doing so he created a new cipher system which was relatively rapid and enjoyed the unrivalled security offered by a one-time pad system. 41 The new system was code- Centre, and that the first prototype of Rockex was shipped to England in the same month. 45 However, some evidence suggests that work on the first prototype did not begin until January 1943
and that it was not until April that a machine was ready for shipping. 46 Regardless, it is clear that GC&CS, in its capacity as Britain's chief cryptographic bureau and (along with SIS) one of the first employers of the system, was involved in monitoring the development of Bayly's machine from the earliest stages of the project.
Rockex allowed almost instantaneous transmission of messages on a one-to-one basis. This meant that important messages could be transmitted very quickly and securely and GC&CS recognised the significance of Bayly's system from the first. Nevertheless, it was clear that the system would require further improvement if it were to take on a greater role in the British communications network. 47 Following Travis's initial viewing of the machine, Bayly set about producing further prototype machines. Soon after the production of the first prototype, a second was constructed and transatlantic tests began. By May 1943 Rockex began carrying SIS and Ultra messages across the Atlantic.
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Of course, because the original Rockex system was designed in order to secure the passage of Meanwhile, from a security perspective, because the system was of American origin, there was the potential that American cryptanalysts might prove able to eavesdrop on the conversations of British officials. 50 The latter proved to be an intolerable risk, and Bayly's system gained the upper hand because it offered security from those who might intercept British traffic ̶ be they enemies or 48 allies. 51 Clearly, the existence of major rival systems highlighted the importance of both planning and experimentation.
Despite the existence of a potential competitor system, Rockex continued to generate significant interest from across Whitehall. As early as August 1943, Edward Travis, then commanding officer of GC&CS, was providing reports of the system's capability that intrigued Foreign Office officials.
They were impressed by the claim that the machine's speed was only 'limited by that obtainable from a good touch-typist, say 50 words a minute.' They also saw considerable utility in the fact that
Bayly's modifications to the system allowed it to be used not only to transmit messages directly by telegraph (a feature the Foreign Office had little use for) but also as a standard cipher machine producing a stream of cipher text which could be transmitted via wireless. Additionally, the promise of more improvements to come made Bayly's machine increasingly attractive. As a result of Travis' outline of the system's specifications, the Foreign Office suggested that the system undergo immediate and thorough testing to ensure that it could indeed perform as described. 52 The Foreign
Office's request for swift action was the product of two issues. First, the system's promised specifications suggested a very formidable machine. Second, it was projected that the establishment of missions in re-occupied countries would place a great strain on the Ministry's communications infrastructure and staff that could create the 'danger of complete breakdown of cypher communications.' friendship between himself and Gordon Welchman, the technocratic, managerially-minded and senior ranking cryptanalyst. 54 In addition to considering mechanical cryptographic problems, one of the key discussions between Welchman and Bayly was on the future of machine cryptography.
During a visit by Bayly to GC&CS, he and Welchman forged ahead with the problems inherent in turning Rockex into a viable machine for widespread use by GC&CS and other branches of the British state. The key problem remained the issue of converting Rockex into a system that could produce a cipher transmittable by wireless without corruptions. In a report to Commander Travis, Welchman warned that considerable theoretical work followed by a significant period of testing and experimentation were required before any viable system could be introduced.
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When Bayly returned to his post in Canada, he and Welchman kept in touch, and Welchman remained intrigued by the Rockex system and how it could be improved. 56 Work on producing a more robust system of greater flexibility soon developed into the Rockex II project. Bayly continued to liaise with GC&CS, including discussions with Alan Turing as well as Welchman during various trans-Atlantic visits. 57 Work on Rockex II generated swift results, and in December 1943 GC&CS reported on the progress of the project. It commented that 'The fact that it has been possible to design and build machines so quickly and the small amount of trouble that has been encountered in preliminary tests are encouraging indications of the simplicity of probable reliability of the apparatus.' However, this optimistic appraisal of the situation was qualified with the caveat that nevertheless 'there is no doubt that the development has been done in a hurry and that these first machines must be regarded as pre-prototypes, and more extensive trials are likely to suggest modification.' It was recommended that, prior to engaging in mass production of the machine, further prototype models be constructed and the experiences gained with these machines be utilised in plans for future Rockex production. 58 Over the next few months of testing, GC&CS's machine development specialists continued to be impressed by the progress made on Rockex II. 59 The initial prototype work on Rockex II continued to be conducted in New York. However, by the summer of 1944 the work had progressed still further and the first prototype machine arrived in England for experimentation in June. 60 The emphasis on experimentation stood in contrast to the earlier processes of technological development utilised by GC&CS. For instance, following the development of the Bombe machine, while also subject to periods of testing and experimentation, early models went into service extremely rapidly with orders placed for more machines, and much of the necessary refining of the apparatus for future models was the result of trial and error on live machines. 61 Rockex II, on the other hand, as shown above, was subjected to a far more rigorous process of refinement before mass-production was to be contemplated.
Once production was underway the task of making one time tape was assigned to the War Office and monitored by GC&CS. Meanwhile, the task of building Rockex-II units was handled by the 'experimental' machines. That cost was estimated at £70,000, only £10,000 of which was nonrecurring. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, wrote that he had 'had an unofficial word on the subject with [Sir Herbert] Brittain of the Treasury, who looks after the non-audit vote, and although he was only too ready to help, it was clear he did not much relish the idea of this expenditure being tabulated under S.S. monies.' Bridges' solution was to suggest that, rather than the costs be charged to the books of the 'S.S.' (presumably the Security Service), they be individually charged to recipient departments and that they be described as 'experimental'. This, as
Bridges pointed out, was, in fact slightly misleading. Prototype machines had already undergone significant development and testing. 64 However, it was certainly the case that 50 was a comparatively low number of machines given the growing demand for them from Whitehall departments.
The 'experimental' system of financing the construction of machines continued until 1951, when the scale of expenses, approximately £1 million per annum without any formal auditing, made
Gambier-Parry 'uncomfortable' and he turned to the Treasury for assistance. By 1949, GambierParry had acquired a factory at Borehamwood, Hertfordshire, and had created a highly unorthodox system for hiding the cost of this secret enterprise. By then, money was flowing in from four sources: SIS, the Ministry of Supply, the Diplomatic Wireless Service, and the Commonwealth Relations Office. Of the £1,000,000, £600,000 came from the latter two and went into public bank accounts while the monies from the former two, approximately £400,000, went into two private 63 Members are well aware that we have only maintained the security of British
Communications throughout the war with considerable difficulty and that in certain fields, our security has been nothing like as good as it should have been Although a great deal has been done to improve the situation over the 18 months and the existence of the Cypher Policy Board and its supporting organisation should ensure that British Communications Security is given adequate consideration in future, the position cannot yet be regarded as satisfactory.
Menzies also complained that while GC&CS had considerable expertise in the field of cryptography, throughout the war there had been 'no planned means' to apply that expertise and experience to the 'security of British communications as a whole'. This was a gap that required filling, so that GC&CS could not only provide advice to its client ministries but also to ensure that, in future, the agency's store of knowledge and experience was available to 'planners and operators of Britain's Communications.' 
Conclusions
The development of the Rockex system, and its much improved successor Rockex II, was a lengthy process that saw inter-Service and department cooperation to develop a complex and revolutionary cypher system. The design and manufacture of the machine saw an unprecedented planning process by GC&CS which used the development of the machine as an opportunity to create a benchmark for future machine research and development. Such was the success of these efforts that variants of the Rockex family were still being utilised in some British embassies until at least the 1970s. 76 As
Ferris notes, in developing and adopting the machine in the final stages of the Second World War, the British state placed Britain as a world leader in cipher security at the outset of the Cold War.
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Prior to the development of Rockex, machine design and research had been a fraught process instigated as a last resort to resolve pressing problems instigated by mounting wartime pressures.
Frank Birch, a senior figure within the agency and the author of its internal history written in the early 1950s, complained in that history that the agency's general administration and organisation in that this relatively last-minute and ad hoc approach (though necessary at the time) to developing its machine sections, could not continue. The machines developed under this approach, while enormously successful, were fragile solutions that could be easily undone by minor alterations to Axis cipher security systems or protocols. The experience of machine development had shown that both cryptanalysis and cryptography had entered a new age, and that future success would be predicated not only on the labours of technical experts with bright ideas, but on long term planning, bureaucratic oversight, and the building of logistical structures.
These were lessons that were learned through trial and error and under conditions of enormous pressure to generate results. But, by the final years of the war, the pressures on the agency had been eased by the arrival of American resources and expertise. Furthermore, GC&CS had evolved into a large, professional and mechanised bureau, complete with teams of expert machine designers and builders and contacts with experts in high-end technology industries. The British state as a whole had also radically realigned itself to deal with the problem of developing communications security, with the formation of inter-service and ministry committees dedicated to overseeing and directing the development of cipher security. Without this combined shift in alignment, across the services and the agency, it is impossible to see how a system such as Rockex II could have been developed in the manner that it was. It is clear that GC&CS had transformed from a collegiate agency that had rapidly, and sometimes unwillingly, adopted mechanised solutions to address machine generated problems into an agency which placed massive emphasis on technology complete with an ingrained technocratic culture. The development of the Rockex family of cipher system was the first major product of that transformation.
For the historian looking to understand how and why GC&CS transformed itself from an archaic and beleaguered organisation, into a highly successful, professional and technologically first-rate intelligence agency, the development of the Rockex family of cipher machines is highly revealing. 
